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STUDENT NOTES
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF A BANK IN THE APPLICATION OF
A DEPOSIT TO THE PAYMENT OF A DEPOSITOR'S
OBLIGATION
It has become customary in present day business transactions
for a bank to be the primary collection agency for notes and other
obligations. In some cases the bank has legal and beneficial interest
in the obligation. In other cases the bank merely holds the obligation
for collection or as pledgee. It is a common practice for a bank
to collect such an indebtedness from one of its depositors by the
simple expedient of deducting from his deposit a sum sufficient
to pay the debt. It is the purpose of this note to discuss the
various situations in which a bank has a right to so apply a deposit,
and also to consider those cases in which a bank owes a duty to a
depositor or a surety on an obligation to apply a deposit to the pay-
ment of the obligation.
Let us consider first the rights of a bank to so apply a deposit.
It is provided in Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
that: "Where the instrument is made payable at a bank it is
equivalent to an order to the bank to pay the same for the account
of the principal debtor thereon." This undoubtedly gives a bank
the right to pay out a deposit in satisfaction of an obligation of
the depositor which is payable at the bank. However, when the
instrument is not expressly made payable at the bank, but the
bank has legal and beneficial interest in it, the bank has the right
to apply the maker's deposit to the payment of the obligation.
This right is based on the principal of set-off of mutual debts.
Clearly, when a bank is indebted to a depositor for the amount
of his deposit and the depositor is indebted to the bank for the
amount of his obligation, these are mutual debts and one may be
set off against the other. There is no such mutuality, however, in
the case of obligations which the bank does not own but merely
holds for collection or as pledgee; unless the obligation is ex-
pressly made payable at the bank, the bank has no right to apply
the maker's deposit in payment of the obligation? In the case
of an obligation which is not yet due, there is no mutuality unless
the maker has become insolvent.' In such a situation the courts
'National Mahaiwe Bank v. Peck, 127 Mass. 298 (1878); Men-
kes Feuer, Inc. v. People's Bank of Johnstown, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 32
(1944).
2 Clearwater County et al. v. Pfeffer, 236 Fed., 183 (1916); Stet-
son v. Exchange Bank, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 425 (1856); Trible v.
Bank of Grenada, 6 Miss. (2 Smedes & M.) 523 (1844).
'Clearwater County et al. v. Pfeffer, 236 Fed. 183 (1916); Ky.
Flour Co's Assignee v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 90 Ky. 225, 13 S. W.
910 (1890). Contra: Harding v. Broadway Nat. Bank of Chelsea,
294 Mass. 13, 200 N. E. 386 (1936).
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consider that the insolvency of the maker causes the obligation
to become immediately due. It is not necessary that the maker
actually be declared insolvent by a court proceeding, but if the
bank can prove him insolvent in fact at the time the set-off is
made, the bank has the right to apply his deposit as a set-off
against the obligation.' This is not considered a preference of.
the bank over other creditors of the insolvent maker, as the equity
of the bank in the deposit is considered superior in time and in
merit to that of the general creditors. Only by allowing the debts
to be set off can they be treated as being on an even basis.
Generally, there is no right to apply a deposit belonging to
someone other than the debtor to the payment of the debt 6 A bank
cannot apply the deposit of a partnership to the payment of a debt
owed by one of the individual partners. Nor does it generally
have the right to-apply the deposit of a member of a partnership
to the indebtedness of the partnership.' However, the individual
partners are jointly and severally liable on an obligation of the
partnership, and by Section 27 of the Kentucky Civil Code, a
creditor of the firm has the right to sue and levy execution against
any one, or all of the partners, at his option. For these reasons,
the Kentucky Court has held that the deposit of one of the part-
ners can be set off against an obligation of the partnership. Pre-
sumably this rule would be followed in other jurisdictions having
a code provision similar to that of Kentucky.
Similarly, a bank has no right to apply a deposit made in
trust for someone other than the depositor,' nor a deposit desig-
nated to some particular use," if the bank has notice of this fact.
This notice is essential, however, or the bank has the right to apply
such a deposit. 2
"Thomas v. Nat. Bank of New Jersey, 16 N. J. Misc. 271, 198
Atl. 539 (1938).
Id.
£Bryant v. Williams, 16 F. 2d 159 (1926); Wescott v. People's
State Bank of Reeseville, 206 Wis. 105, 238 N. W. 803 (1931).
'Hulse v. Knapp, 20 F. Supp. 137 (1937); First State Bank of
Denton v. Vestal and Naugle, 48 S. W. 2d 706 (Tex. 1932).
'Hulse v. Knapp, 20 F. Supp. 137 (1937); Teeters v. City Nat.
Bank of Auburn, 214 Ind. 498, 14 N. E. 2d 1004 (1938); Elliott et al.
v. Flynn Bros., 184 S. C. 391, 192 S. E. 400 (1937).
9 Owsley v. Bank of Cumberland, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1726, 66 S. W.
33 (1902).
"First Nat. Bank of Owenton v. Greene, 114 S. W. 322 (Ky.
1908); Menkes Feuer, Inc. v. People's Bank of Johnstown, 43 N. Y. S.
2d 32 (1944); Western Shoe Co. v. Amarillo Nat. Bank, 42 S. W.
2d 469 (Tex. 1931).
" Twentieth Street Bank v. Gilmore, 71 F. 2d 594 (1934); Royse
v. Winchester Bank, 148 Ky. 368, 146 S. W. 738 (1912); Hadley v.
Passaic Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 113 N. J. Eq. 548, 168 Atl. 38
(1933); First Nat. Bank of Schulenburg v. Winkler, 146 S. W. 2d
201 (Tex. 1940).
"White v. Pacific Southwest Trust and Savings Bank, 9 F. 2d
650 (1926).
L.J.-6
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Let us now consider the duties of a bank to apply a deposit
in payment of a depositor's obligation. In those cases in which
a bank has no right to apply a deposit, it of course has no duty
to make such application. But when a bank has a right to apply
a deposit there are, in addition, some situations in which there
is a corresponding duty, to the maker or to a surety or indorser
on the instrument, to apply the maker's deposit to the payment
of the obligation.
There is only one instance in which a bank owes a duty to
the maker of the obligation. If the bank becomes insolvent, the
depositor has a right to insist on the application of his deposit
to the payment of an obligation held by the bank and on which
he is primarily liable.1 ' This right of the depositor, which gives
rise to a corresponding duty on the part of the bank, is based on
the same equities which give the bank the right of set-off when
the depositor-maker becomes insolvent.
It is often insisted that a bank owes a duty to a surety or
indorser on a note or other instrument to apply the maker's de-
posit to the payment of the instrument, and that the failure of the
bank to so apply will discharge the surety. But the general rule
is that the bank is under no duty in such a situation, and the
surety or indorser will not be discharged by the bank's failure to
apply the deposit.' It has been held in some states that there is
a duty to apply a deposit existing at the time the note matures,' and
in one jurisdiction it is held that there is a duty to apply a deposit
made subsequent to maturity."
The Kentucky Court makes a clear distinction between a de-
posit existing 'at the time the note matures, and a deposit made
subsequent to its maturity. In the first situation, there is such a
duty to apply that the failure of the bank will discharge the obliga-
tion of a surety. 7 In the second situation the bank has the right to
set off the deposit but is held to no duty to do so.' This latter rule
was adopted as recently as 1930 when, in the case of Farmer's Na-
"Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499 (1892); Rossi Bros. v. Com-
missioner of Banks in Possession of Highland Trust Co., 283 Mass.
114, 186 N. E. 234 (1933).
"Davenport v. State Banking Co., 126 Ga. 136, 54 S. E. 977
(1906); Second National Bank of Lafayette v. Hill, 76 Ind. App. 225,
40 Am. Rep. 239 (1881); Nat. Mahaiwe Bank v. Peck, 127 Mass. 298
(1898); ARANT, SURETYSHIP (1931) Sec. 65; Note (1916) 29 HARV. L.
REV. 231.
"Tatum v. Commercial Bank and Trust Co., 193 Ala. 120, 69
So. 508 (1915); Franklin Savings and Trust Co. of Pittsburg v.
Clark, 283 Pa. 212, 129 Atl. 56 (1925).
"McDowell v. Bank of Wilmington and Brandywine, 1 Harr.
369 (Del. 1834).
7 Pursifull v. Pineville Banking Company's Assignee, 97 Ky. 154,
30 S. W. 203 (1885).
"Farmer's Nat. Bank v. Jones, 234 Ky. 591, 28 S. W. 2d 787
(1930).
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tional Bank v. Jones," the court specifically overruled previous de-
cisions which had imposed a duty on the bank to apply deposits made
subsequent to maturity.
It would seem that the better rule would be to hold that the
bank has no duty to an indorser or surety on a note to apply
deposits made either at or after its maturity. The relation of a
bank to its depositor is merely that of debtor-creditor. The bank
has no lien on the deposit for payment of the note, as the bank
has actual title to the money which the maker of the note has
deposited, and the bank certainly has no express nor implied
agreement to hold the deposit as collateral for the note, nor in
trust for the surety. The fact that the creditor bank is named
as the place of payment of the note may act as a direction to apply
the deposit to the payment of the note at maturity, but this should
not impose any obligation on the bank, nor preclude the 'right of
the depositor to draw on his account whenever he desires. The
contract formed by the deposit is independent of the contract on
the note. It would seem to be an unwarranted obstruction to
commercial transactions to impose upon the bank the duty of
withholding payment of every check until it is definitely ascer-
tained that the depositor has no note owing the bank which has
come due on that banking day or previously.
The foregoing review of the cases applicable to the rights and
duties of a bank in making a set-off of a deposit against an obliga-
tion of the depositor leads to the conclusions whfch follow. Only
when there is mutuality between the two debts does a bank have
a right to set off one against the other. When other factors enter
to complicate the situation and destroy the mutuality, the bank
can usually make no such application of the deposit. Generally
it may be said that a bank has no duty to apply a deposit to the
payment of an obligation of the depositor, except in one instance.
When the bank itself has become insolvent, it owes a duty to the
depositor.
The fact cannot be disputed that it is advisable for the bank
to be able to protect itself, as far as possible, as the holder of a
note of one of its depositors. But due to the growing complexity
of commercial transactions and the increasing volume of business
done by modern banks in both the checking and the loan depart-
ments, it would seem advisable to separate the two functions of
the bank completely, and to consider the depositor who is creditor
of the bank for the amount of his deposit, and the maker of a note
who is a debtor of the bank for the amount of his note, as two
separate and distinct persons, for this purpose.
MARY GARNER BORDEN
'" Id.
